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* Kieran McQuinn1 
ABSTRACT 
In this Article, we address one of the major policy issues in the Irish economy at 
present, namely the undersupply of residential housing. Particularly given the 
recent, adverse impacts of pandemic-related public health restrictions on housing 
supply, we argue that a significant increase in the provision of publicly provided 
housing is now required to help bridge the growing gap between actual supply 
levels and the structural demand for housing. To investigate the public financing of 
such an investment we examine the future conduct of Irish fiscal policy. Given the 
expected strong post-COVID-19 performance of the Irish economy and the likely 
continued low cost of sovereign debt, we argue that the adoption of a consistently 
negative Government primary balance can be pursued under a prudent and 
sustainable set of conditions. Such a policy could provide the Exchequer with an 
additional annual amount of between €4 billion and €7 billion. 
1. INTRODUCTION AND HOUSING MARKET PRESSURES 
Arguably, one of the most significant long-lasting effects of COVID-19 on Irish 
society is the adverse impact on the provision of housing. While the introduction 
of significant fiscal support payments such as the Pandemic Unemployment 
Payment and the Employment Wage Subsidy Scheme have to a large extent 
cushioned income levels (see Doorley et al., 2020 for more on this), and hence 
affordability on the demand side of the housing market, the nature of the public 
health restrictions has had a particularly adverse impact on residential supply.  
 
As noted in a wide variety of studies, a significant imbalance had already existed in 
the Irish housing market between supply and demand; however as pointed out in 
Allen-Coghlan et al. (2020), the relatively slow response of the supply side of the 
Irish housing market to a significant shock risks exacerbating this imbalance in a 
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annual increases observed in house prices for February 2021, however housing 
supply may take some time to recover. 
 
To put the imbalance in the housing market in some perspective; a recent study by 
Bergin and Garcia-Rodriguez (2020) estimates that the structural demand for 
housing in the Irish economy is approximately 35,000 units per annum. This 
demand for housing is largely a function of population growth and housing 
preferences, and population growth is largely determined by economic conditions. 
This estimate tallies with previous work by Duffy et al. (2016) and Byrne et al. 
(2014). Estimates of housing demand are of course particularly sensitive to 
assumptions concerning migration and headship rates. For example, Conefrey and 
Staunton (2019) conduct a scenario where they assume that Irish headship rates 
converge to UK rates; this results in an estimate of 47,000 units per annum over 
the period 2020-2029. 
 
Figure 1 summarises housing completions and the structural demand estimate. It 
includes actual completions from 2012 to 2020 and forecasts from the latest QEC 
for 2021 and 2022. The lower forecasts for 2021 and 2022 reflect the trends in 
leading indicators for the residential sector such as commencement data and 
planning permissions. Also, under the new guidelines for the Level 5 lockdown 
restrictions introduced in early January 2021, construction work was no longer 
deemed essential and did not commence again until April 2021. 
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It is clear from the graph the scale of the imbalance and the growing nature of the 
divergence in coming years. This is likely to result in further upward pressure on 
house prices and rent levels. Any such increase in housing costs comes in the 
context of significant existing affordability challenges in the Irish residential 
market. Two recent studies of housing affordability pressures (Corrigan et al., 
2019; O’Toole et al., 2020) document the high share of households facing high 
housing costs; prior to the pandemic approximately one-in-three households who 
were not in receipt of State housing supports were classed as having insufficient 
income after housing costs to afford a standard basket of goods and services. 
Indeed Corrigan et al. (2019) note that these affordability challenges are a 
structural feature of the Irish housing market. Separately, Honohan (2021) 
identifies the elevated cost of housing in Ireland as one of the main reasons for the 
relatively high domestic cost of living when compared with other Euro Area 
countries. 
 
In this paper, we examine whether the State can afford to significantly increase the 
provision of housing. Using plausible future values for key fiscal parameters in the 
domestic context, we examine what future Irish fiscal policy could look like after 
the pandemic. We examine whether it is possible for the State to run a persistent 
negative Government primary balance in a sustainable and prudent manner over 
the medium term.  
2. FUTURE IRISH FISCAL POLICY 
From a cross-country perspective, one of the more significant economic impacts of 
the COVID-19 pandemic has been the sizeable increase in borrowing and hence 
sovereign debt levels which has occurred. In the European Union, for example, the 
fiscal rules framework introduced as part of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in 
2011 have been formally suspended, thereby enabling Member States to increase 
substantially their levels of public sector borrowing.  
 
The interruption in the conduct of European fiscal policy has given rise to a growing 
debate about the future of the fiscal rules, especially when the effects of the 
pandemic have started to subside. This debate has been further stimulated by the 
particularly low rates of interest on sovereign debt which have been observed in 
recent years. Indeed, it can be argued that the European fiscal rules were 
originated and devised under the standard assumption that such interest rates 
would equal if not exceed the rate of growth of the respective economy in 
question; namely that:  




where r is the interest rate on government debt and g is the nominal rate of 
economic growth. However, even before the onset of COVID-19, interest rates, on 
an international basis, had been declining on a persistent basis. As noted by 
Furman and Summers (2020), the neutral safe real rate (the rate which maintains 
aggregate demand at potential output) across countries has been consistently 
falling since the 1980s. Within a Euro Area context, the low cost of borrowing for 
sovereigns has also been greatly facilitated by the policies initiated and maintained 
by the European Central Bank (ECB) since 2012 (see Schnabel, 2020, for more on 
these). These policies have kept the yield curves for Member States relatively flat 
even in the presence of the increased borrowing necessitated by COVID-19. 
 
FIGURE 2 IRISH GOVERNMENT YIELD CURVE (%): APRIL 2021 
 
 
Sources: Bloomberg and author’s calculations. 
 
The present low cost of borrowing in a domestic context can be observed from 
Figure 2, which plots the Irish yield curve for sovereign bonds. Irish yields are 
negative up to eight years, the 20-year yield is 0.4 per cent while the 30-year yield 
is just 0.8 per cent. 
 
This low cost of borrowing is in contrast to the expected growth outlook for the 
Irish economy over the next ten years. Bergin et al. (2021) have outlined a series 
of post-COVID-19 scenarios for the Irish economy on the basis of COSMO – the 
large scale macro-econometric model of the Irish economy. These and other 
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and McQuinn (2021). Under a recovery scenario Bergin et al. (2021) forecast that 
the Irish economy will average a 4.5 per cent growth rate between 2024 and 2030. 
 
To investigate the impact of these likely trends in r and g for future Irish fiscal 
policy, we avail of the well-known steady-state relationship between Government 
debt and the primary balance ratio: 
𝑏𝑏 = 𝑠𝑠 �
1 + 𝑔𝑔
𝑟𝑟 − 𝑔𝑔
� , or equivalently 𝑠𝑠 = 𝑏𝑏 �
𝑟𝑟 − 𝑔𝑔
1 + 𝑔𝑔
�                (2) 
 
As outlined in Blanchard et al. (2021), for a specific level of the primary balance s, 
there is a debt-to-GDP ratio b, which if exceeded will cause the debt level to 
explode. Similarly, for any debt-to-GDP ratio b, there is a primary balance s, which 
if the actual balance is lower than s, then the debt will again explode. 
 
In the present context we specify a specific debt-to-GDP ratio and solve for the 
corresponding primary balance ratio s. This is because we believe a small open 
economy such as Ireland’s should set the debt-to-GDP ratio on a relatively 
conservative basis. The unprecedented nature of the pandemic and the costs 
associated with it highlight the importance of an economy such as Ireland’s having 
a sufficient buffer established in case of such emergencies. Consequently, we set 
as a baseline ratio 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 = 45 per cent. Pre-pandemic, government policy had 
stated that 45 per cent of GDP was the relevant medium-term target for Ireland 
(Budget 2017).  
 
Table 1 presents the results of the simulation of (2) under a variety of different 
growth rates and three different interest rates. While the 30-year yield on Irish 
bonds is short of 1 per cent, we take a range from 1 to 2 per cent as our interest 
rates for the scenarios. We take a relatively conservative path for the interest rate 
as Blanchard et al. (2021) acknowledge ‘economists have little sense of the right 
magnitudes’ in terms of the impact of additional borrowing on the sovereign’s 
interest rate. However, Blanchard et al. (2021) do argue that the impact is likely to 
be smaller for countries in the European Union (EU) due to the EU’s highly 
integrated nature. 
 
To demonstrate the sensitivity of the results, we also include the simulations with 




For the nominal growth rate of the Irish economy (g), we again take a relatively 
conservative range of 4.0 to 6.0 per cent. The 4.5 per cent growth rate forecast in 
Bergin and Garcia-Rodriguez (2020) is a real growth rate whereas ‘g’ is a nominal 
rate. If we assume a rate of inflation of approximately 1 per cent, this means the 
equivalent real output growth range is between 3.0 and 5.0 per cent. 
 
TABLE 1  FUTURE FISCAL POLICY SIMULATIONS FOR THE IRISH ECONOMY (%) 
   r=1  r=1.5  r=2 
45 g s €bn s €bn s €bn 
 4.0 -1.3 5.13 -1.1 4.27 -0.009 3.42 
 4.5 -1.5 5.95 -1.3 5.10 -1.1 4.25 
 5.0 -1.7 6.77 -1.5 5.93 -1.3 5.08 
 5.5 -1.9 7.58 -1.7 6.74 -1.5 5.90 
 6.0 -2.1 8.38 -1.9 7.55 -1.7 6.71 
        
 𝒃𝒃𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂  g s €bn s €bn s €bn 
60 4.0 -1.7 6.84 -1.4 5.70 -1.2 4.56 
 4.5 -2.0 7.94 -1.7 6.80 -1.4 5.67 
 5.0 -2.3 9.03 -2.0 7.90 -1.7 6.77 
 5.5 -2.6 10.11 -2.3 8.99 -2.0 7.86 
 6.0 -2.8 11.18 -2.5 10.06 -2.3 8.94 
 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
Note:  The additional revenue generated (€ billion) is in terms of 2021 GDP (€395 billion). 
 
The results in the table indicate that, even under prudent assumptions, the Irish 
Exchequer would be able to raise approximately €4 billion to €7 billion each year 
in additional resources for the State while still keeping the public finances on a 
sustainable and prudent path. The latest Stability Programme Update (SPU) 
released by the Department of Finance2 expects a General Government Balance 
(GGB)3 of €0.8 billion by 2025. 
3. FUNDING CAPITAL INVESTMENT 
In the present year, the Exchequer’s capital allocation for housing as set out in 
Budget 2021 is €2.0 billion. This is forecast to add 12,750 additional units to the 
social housing stock. Of this, 9,500 are to be built, with 800 targeted acquisitions 
and 2,450 leased homes. However, given the supply and demand data presented 




2  Available online at: https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/d3e2f-stability-programme-update-2021/.  
3  Note the GGB measures the fiscal performance of all arms of government. It provides an accurate assessment of the 
fiscal performance of a more complete government sector, whereas the primary balance is Government net lending 
excluding interest payments on consolidated government liabilities. 
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the medium term. Additionally, even if housing supply were to approximate the 
level of structural demand in a given year, this does not allow for the imbalances 
which have accumulated over the past ten years.  
 
What is particularly clear from recent trends in the housing market is that the 
private sector, on its own, is struggling to meet current housing demands. Indeed, 
combining the forecast provision of State housing along with the overall forecast 
of 15,000 units indicates that private sector housing supply is likely to be less than 
10,000 units for both this and next year. A number of reasons have been advanced 
for the inability of the private sector to increase its scale of production; changes in 
the nature of financing after the great financial crisis (GFC) means that developers 
now have to provide a significant amount of equity funding up front before 
developments are green-lighted by financial institutions; other commentators 
have cited the relatively high cost of construction in the Irish market as a potential 
reason.4 Either way, even in the presence of particularly high house price levels, 
when compared with other Western economies (see Bricongne et al., 2019, for 
more on this), it is evident that the domestic construction sector is unable to meet 
the scale of production required.  
 
Our analysis indicates that between €4 billion and €7 billion could be generated on 
an annual basis through such a policy. One proposal, therefore, is to double the 
existing capital investment in State provided housing to €4 billion per annum. 
Based on current production levels, this would have the potential to deliver 
approximately 18,000 units per annum.  
 
Clearly, such a significant increase in activity would bring sizeable challenges in 
terms of ensuring efficient delivery of the extra units. Who would build these extra 
units, for example? Could the private sector be engaged by the State to deliver the 
extra housing? More activity in the housing sector may lead to an increase in 
inflationary pressures more generally. It would almost certainly involve an 
expanded mandate for State agencies such as the recently initiated Land 
Development Authority (LDA) to identify suitable sites and coordinate on a 
nationwide basis the delivery of the units. As part of any relationship between the 
State and the private sector in providing housing units, capacity constraints in the 
domestic labour market would have to be carefully considered. One potential risk 
concerning any sizeable increase in State investment is the potential for ‘crowding 




4  One difficulty in this regard is even getting agreement on the actual cost of building a residential unit in the Irish market. 
See https://www.irishtimes.com/business/construction/idea-that-only-councils-should-build-social-housing-is-
nonsense-1.4440399 for example. 
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of supply in the private sector, increased State involvement in the supply side of 
the market could ‘crowd in’ as opposed to’ crowd out’ residential investment. 
 
One area where crowding in could occur is in the greater availability of finance for 
those engaged in construction in the private sector. In seeking to increase housing 
output, the State could commission greater levels of activity from those in the 
private sector. This, in turn, could enhance the ability of those in the private sector 
to secure development finance from financial institutions. 
4. PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE OF IRISH PUBLIC SECTOR BORROWING 
Attitudes amongst policymakers and analysts to public borrowing in an Irish 
context are somewhat conditioned by the adverse experience of the Irish State 
over the period 1977-1987. As can be seen from Figure 3, between 1980 and 1987 
the GGB averaged over 10 per cent as the State engaged in a sustained bout of 
borrowing. The balance improved as the Celtic Tiger emerged in the early 1990s 
and actually reached a peak surplus of nearly 5 per cent in 2000.  
 
FIGURE 3 IRISH GENERAL GOVERNMENT BALANCE (GGB) (%) 1980-2020 
 
 
Source: Department of Finance. 
 
The impacts of the GFC and the substantial loans provided to the banking sector 
are evident in the balances from 2008 to 2012, while the improvement in the public 
finances is again apparent from 2013 onwards. In 2020, a negative GGB of 5 per 
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2021 (McQuinn et al., 2021). These latter deficits reflect the cost of the traditional 
and new welfare payments provided to support family incomes due to COVID-19. 
 
The overall cost of debt to the State can be observed from Figure 4, which plots 
the ratio of debt interest payments to the total income taxation take. This is plotted 
from 1982 to 2020. The substantial pressure on the domestic Exchequer in the 
early to mid-1980s due to the high levels of borrowing and its relatively high cost 
are clear. In 1985 for example, the ratio of debt repayments to the income tax take 
was an enormous 84 per cent. Just prior to the GFC, the ratio had declined to just 
under 12 per cent. However, it is worth noting that even at the peak of the GFC, 
the resulting strain on income tax revenue at 47 per cent was still somewhat below 
the rates in the early 1980s. 
 
FIGURE 4  RATIO OF DEBT REPAYMENTS TO INCOME TAXATION REVENUE (%) 1982-2020 
 
 
Sources: Department of Finance and QEC calculations. 
 
The political as well as economic difficulties in dealing with the deterioration in the 
public finances in the 1980s serve as a stark warning concerning the perils of over 
reliance on such a source of Government funding. 
 
However, in considering a policy of a sustained negative primary balance ratio s, 
there are some significant differences between the present circumstance and the 
earlier period: 
1. The Irish economy is arguably in a much more robust state at present than 
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2. This is particularly the case in terms of the performance of the Irish labour 
market and job creation generally; 
3. There is a greater acceptance that sustained borrowing particularly for a 
small open economy such as Ireland’s should only be for capital investment 
and not as it was in the 1980s for current expenditure purposes; 
4. It should not be used, for example, to offset any shortfall which may arise 
due to a possible decline in current taxation receipts. For example, there has 
been growing concern (McQuinn et al., 2020; IMF, 2021) about the 
sustainability of the significant increase in Irish corporation tax receipts in 
recent years; 
5. Ongoing analysis would assess whether a policy of sustained borrowing was 
having an impact on the sovereign’s interest rate; 
6. Any borrowing undertaken should be subject to relatively conservative fiscal 
assumptions as outlined in Table 1; 
7. Borrowing for capital investment should prioritise projects which increase 
the productive capacity of the domestic economy. 
 
This last point is of growing importance. It is clear that the high level of domestic 
housing costs is one of the main reasons for the increased cost of living in Ireland 
when compared with other countries (see Honohan, 2021 and Coffey, 2021 for 
more). The lack of adequate housing supply is, therefore, one of the biggest 
challenges to our competitiveness as an economy (see Ireland’s Competitiveness 
Challenge, 2020). A sustained increase in housing supply should alleviate this 
persistent upward pressure on the cost of living. 
 
It is true that higher levels of activity in the non-traded sector (housing) in the 
presence of frictions in the labour market could also damage our competitiveness. 
These inflationary pressures which would be more near-term in nature would have 
to be mitigated in some way by, for example, facilitating greater inward migration 
of workers with the requisite skill levels for the construction sector. 
 
It should be noted as well that a sustained increase in housing supply and 
particularly in the provision of social and affordable housing could reduce 
expenditure by the State in other areas. In 2021, it is estimated that total State 
expenditure on housing assistant payments (HAP) will have come to €1.4 billion 
since the introduction of the scheme. This scheme enables local authorities to 
make a monthly payment to a landlord on behalf of a tenant who pays a weekly 
contribution based on their household income. Owing to the relatively low levels 
of housing supply available in the Irish market, this scheme has grown in popularity 
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since its inception in 2014 when the initial budget outlay was €390,000. A sustained 
increase in affordable housing supply would reduce the necessity for such a 
scheme and, hence, the State’s outlay on it. 
5. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
It is increasingly clear that a long-lasting impact of COVID-19 on Irish society will be 
the reduced pace of housing supply. This outcome compounds an already pressing 
issue in Irish economic and social life. The analysis in the paper suggests that, given 
likely developments in the Irish economy over the medium term, it will be possible 
for the Government to generate additional funds through borrowing in a sustained 
but prudent manner. Crucially, this borrowing will still enable the State to have a 
fiscal buffer in place to meet either anticipated or unanticipated shocks to the 
economy. 
 
While such a significant scaling up in publicly provided construction would 
generate sizeable challenges in terms of efficient delivery, it does appear that, as a 
society, we will fall significantly short of meeting the level of demand for 
accommodation in the absence of such investment. 
 
There are, of course, many pressing demands for additional State capital 
investment in areas such as health, education and the adoption of green 
technologies and each of these must be evaluated on its own merits. However, 
without significant investment, we risk experiencing another decade of inadequate 
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